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ABSTRACT 
 
The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 left a trail of destruction throughout South Asia.  
Overseas aid agencies, overwhelmed by donations, committed to manage the funds 
responsibly. Criticism of the relief effort soon followed, potentially threatening the 
credibility or perceptions of legitimacy for these organisations.  The for-profit sector 
uses impression management in annual reports in response to legitimacy threats.  This 
study anticipated a similar reaction from non-profit organisations.  Annual reports of 
Australian overseas aid agencies were analysed for any change in the use of impression 
management tactics prior to and post the event.  The results indicate there was no 
significant difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.0 Introduction 
 
 
On 26 December 2004 the Indian Ocean tsunami swept through South Asia leaving behind 
an unprecedented trail of destruction and human calamity.  The world was quick to 
respond.  In Australia major overseas aid agencies were overwhelmed by contributions 
from the public (ABC News, 2004a, 2004b).  One organisation closed their fundraising 
program within days of the event, having raised the targeted amount of $1 million (ABC 
News, 2005a).  The top six aid agencies had closed their appeals by March, 2005 having 
collected $243 million (Hannan, 2005).  Overall contributions from business and the 
general public in Australia in 2005 exceeded the record amount of $375 million (Bell, 
2005).   Following a relief planning meeting with the Australian Governor General the 
major agencies committed to reduce overheads, provide fully audited reports and maintain 
accountability (ABC News, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, and 2005f).   
 
Almost immediately complaints about the quantity and quality of aid provided in the region 
emerged (ABC News, 2005e).  In Sri Lanka, six weeks after the event, many had not 
received the basics of food, water or shelter while others received unsuitable clothing and 
inappropriate aid.  Many of the criticisms were directed at larger aid agencies (The Age, 
2005, The Associated Press, 2005).  Over the next six months the tsunami aid effort 
continued to receive bad press.  In April, two major agencies were connected to the loss of 
large sums of money through corruption and graft (The Associated Press, 2005).  In June 
2005 a review by Oxfam found that the poor had been further marginalised with most of 
the aid going to businesses and landowners (BBC News, 2005).  Twelve months later 
reports still questioned the effectiveness of the aid agencies and of the aid provided (ABC 
AM, 2006). 
 
Overseas aid agencies, like all non government organisations (NGO), are highly dependent 
on projecting a vital image and sound reputation to maintain legitimacy and access to 
funding bases (Bennett and Gabriel, 2003). The negative publicity associated with the 
tsunami relief effort posed a threat to the credibility of the operations of overseas aid 
organisations. This loss of legitimacy has the potential to impact on future financial support 
(Abraham, 2007).  A number of studies have linked the use of impression management 
tactics to sustaining or maintaining organisational legitimacy, especially after negative 
events (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992, Ogden and Clark, 2005, Arndt and Bigelow, 2000).  
Prior research concerning the “for-profit sector” indicates that if an organisation’s 
legitimacy is threatened it will influence the content and tone of the voluntary disclosure 
sections of annual reports (Deegan, 2000).  Australian overseas aid agencies, dependent on 
government funding, are now required to provide an annual report considered the 
“principal window of organisational performance, activity and accountability” (ACFID, 
2004).  This research questions if Australian overseas aid agencies have responded to the 
criticism and media scrutiny associated with the tsunami relief effort through disclosure in 
the voluntary sections of their annual reports.   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Firstly the paper will discuss legitimacy and the 
implications it holds for non government organisations.  It will then consider why these 
organisations may have perceived this criticism as a threat to legitimacy, what impression 
  
management options were available to them or how they may have responded to the 
perceived threat.  The study will then review the annual reports of organisations nominated 
by the Australian government as providing assistance for the tsunami affected areas.  The 
voluntary disclosure section will be analysed in an attempt to identify if impression 
management techniques were used to repair legitimacy.  The research will focus on the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) letter as this is considered the most widely read section of 
annual reports.  It is generally used to promote a corporate image and build credibility in 
the for-profit sector (Hyland, 1998, Prasad and Mir, 2002). 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
 
Organisational Legitimacy 
Legitimacy theory is a system-based theory that has been developed over the past three 
decades.  It is based on the concept that an organisation is assumed to be influenced by, and 
have influence upon, the society in which it operates (Deegan, 2000).  The theory asserts 
that organisations wish to ensure their activities are perceived as legitimate and so attempt 
to operate within the bounds and norms of their respective society.  According to Suchman 
(1995:574) legitimacy is “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions”.   
 
There are many different reasons why an organisation may seek legitimacy.  Legitimacy 
affects how people act towards and understand organisations.  A legitimate organisation is 
seen as more worthy, meaningful, predictable and trustworthy (Suchman, 1995).  
Organisations that are perceived to be legitimate will find it easier to attract resources and 
support, both social and political.  Organisations exist to the extent that society considers 
they are legitimate (Deegan, 2002).  The theory relies upon the concept of a “social 
contract” and the organisation’s survival will be threatened if it has breached this contract.  
Such a breach may result in a decline in demand for the product of the organisation, a 
decline in investment in the organisation, suppliers eliminating supplies to the organisation 
and increased government taxes or fines.   
 
Legitimacy and NGOs 
Much of the previous research concerning legitimacy theory has involved studies of 
corporations and for-profit organisations (Ogden and Clarke, 2005, Campbell et al, 2003, 
Deegan et al, 2000, O’Donovan, 2002).  However legitimacy is also of particular 
importance to NGOs.  In a study on the image and reputation of charities, Bennett and 
Gabriel (2003) questioned 161 members of the general public about their perceptions of 
major UK charities and what influenced donor behaviour.  The results of their study 
suggest that charities need to project an image based on being caring and compassionate, 
non-political, dynamic and of devoting their resources to beneficiaries rather than spending 
on administration.  These expectations about how these organisations should conduct their 
operations relate to the “social contract” concept.  There is an expectation that the 
organisation should prove themselves legitimate and relevant to society providing socially 
desirable benefits to the community at large (Deegan, 2002).  Abraham (2007) referred to 
Morgan and Hunt’s  commitment trust model which supports the above concept by 
contending that “commitment to give is driven by trust and that trust itself is driven by 
  
shared values and communication”.  If the “social contract” is challenged, as in the case of 
NGOs receiving negative publicity, it has the potential to impact on the resources available 
to the sector (Abraham, 2007:6).  Failure to comply with the expectations of society may 
lead to withdrawal of support and the limiting of donations and government assistance.   
 
Financing for NGOs is heavily reliant on fund raising through voluntary contributions of 
time or money and funding through government grants (Lyons, 2001, National Roundtable 
of Non-profit Organisations, 2004).  Recent research conducted for the Department of 
Family and Community Services (2005) found that Australians overall are contributing 
more than ever both in financial contributions and hours of volunteering.  However, this 
increased contribution is shared between an estimated 700,000 non-profit organisations.  
As government funding is generally allocated on a competitive basis and a lack of 
resources is a major constraint on the provision of services, the NGO sector is highly 
competitive (DFaCS, 2005, AusAid, 1999).  This competition for resources combined with 
the need to meet society’s expectations means that legitimacy is just as relevant for NGOs 
as it is for corporations. 
 
Legitimation Tactics 
There is a range of different legitimation techniques that can be employed depending on 
whether the organisation is attempting to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy.  New 
organisations and those undergoing restructuring or launching a new product will need to 
gain legitimacy and will generally use a proactive approach (Suchman, 1995).  Managers 
wishing to gain legitimacy have the benefit of advance knowledge of their plans and can 
assess their needs for legitimacy.  An established and well regarded organisation may have 
already gained legitimacy and therefore maintaining legitimacy should be less problematic.  
However legitimacy cannot be taken for granted.  Community expectations change and 
what was once deemed as acceptable may no longer be tolerated.  Organisations therefore 
need to perceive changes in society’s views and protect their past accomplishments 
(Suchman, 1995).   
 
Repairing legitimacy strategies are usually reactive and in response to unforeseen events 
(O’Donovan, 2002).  “Bad news” events can create a legitimacy gap.  A legitimacy gap is a 
breakdown of the “social contract” which occurs when the actions and activities of the 
organisation differ from society’s expectations and perceptions of how the organisation 
should conduct its business (O’Donovan, 2002).   
 
Managers can use a range of strategies to repair legitimacy.  They may compile a 
normalising account that separates the threatening event from other “big picture” 
assessments of the organisation (Suchman, 1995).  Prior research into the impact of 
negative media coverage of environmental issues by Brown and Deegan (1998) found that, 
in most industries, higher levels of media coverage on an issue were significantly 
associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure about those topics in annual reports.  
Deegan et al (2000) examined the annual reports of Australian firms in industries 
associated with major social incidents including the Bhopal gas explosion, the Moura Mine 
disaster and three major oil spills (two directly affecting Australia and one overseas, Exxon 
Valdez).  They found that the firms increased the social information in their reports post the 
  
events for all the incidents in the study except one – the incident that did not attract a great 
degree of media attention.    
 
Alternatively the managers may deny, excuse, justify or explain the event and their 
involvement.  They may even disassociate themselves from the delegitimising event 
(Suchman, 1995).  These behaviours are known as impression management tactics. 
 
Impression Management  
The term impression management refers to the study of behaviours or strategies put in 
place by an individual in order to be perceived favourably by others (Hooghiemstra, 2000).  
It may be a conscious or unconscious action to control or manipulate impressions formed 
by others.  In accounting literature impression management theory has been adopted and 
applied to explain the response of organisations dealing with legitimacy challenges.  
Impression management can contribute to a firm’s reputation and, when faced with a 
predicament, effectively handle legitimacy threats that could affect this reputation 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000).   
 
Mohamed, Gardner and Paolillo (1999:109) reviewed prior studies in this area to compile a 
taxonomy of organisational impression management tactics (OIM) or behaviours used to 
manage “perceptions of performance” or used for “projecting a favourable image”.  Firstly 
the taxonomy differentiates between direct and indirect techniques: 
• Direct OIM refers to how information is presented about one’s own traits, abilities and 
accomplishments.   
• Indirect OIM relates to the management of information about associates to protect 
one’s image.  
 
They further classify OIM tactics as either assertive or defensive.  Assertive tactics are 
opportunistic in nature and take advantage of a situation to boost one’s own image.  
Defensive tactics are adopted in response to difficult predicaments (Mohamed et al, 1999).  
A summary of the direct assertive and defensive strategies is attached; see Appendix A.  
When legitimacy is threatened an organisation will attempt to both maintain, and in 
particular repair, legitimacy through communication strategies, making use of both 
assertive and defensive tactics in annual reports (Suchman, 1995, Arndt and Bigelow, 
2000).  Mohamed et al (1999) identified a variety of media techniques used by 
organisations to manage corporate image, including corporate advertising, publicity events 
and annual reports.  This communication or disclosure represents a means whereby 
organisations attempt to manage the impressions they make.    
 
This is supported by Suchman (1995:586) who states “legitimacy management rests 
heavily on communication – in this case communication between the organisation and its 
various audiences.”  Similarly Deegan (2002) determined that legitimacy theory is based on 
perceptions and to have effect, any remedial strategies must be accompanied by disclosure 
of some type.  In their study on the reaction of Australian firms to major social incidents, 
Deegan et al (2000:127) believe their results “highlight the strategic nature of voluntary 
social disclosures and are consistent with a view that management considers that annual 
report social disclosures are a useful device to reduce the effects upon a corporation of 
events that are perceived to be unfavourable to a corporation’s image”.  This and other 
  
research into legitimacy and impression management has targeted the disclosure in the 
voluntary section of annual reports (Deegan et al, 2000, Arndt and Bigelow, 2000, Ogden 
and Clarke, 2005, Campbell et al, 2003). 
 
Prior studies of voluntary disclosure in the for-profit sector have focused on the content of 
the CEO letters (Amernic and Craig, 2004, Prasad and Mir, 2002, Hyland, 1998).  This 
section of the annual report is considered a very important tool for organisations to 
communicate with shareholders/stakeholders.  As Prasad and Mir (2002:95) state “letters to 
shareholders occupy pride of place and are the most widely read part of the report.”  
Amernic and Craig (2004:328) agree describing the CEO letter as “a form of sense 
making”.  They chose to study the content of CEO letters because of the importance placed 
on the construction of the letter, the personal commitment representation of the CEO and 
the insight provided into the organisation’s strategic direction.  Hyland (1998:224) also 
agrees describing the CEO letter as a tool for “building credibility and imparting 
confidence” used to promote a corporate image to a wide range of stakeholders including 
regulatory agencies and the investing public.  Therefore it is considered that the CEO 
letters from the annual reports involved would be an obvious place for impression 
management to occur if it was being applied.   
 
The Tsunami Aftermath  
The significant media attention and subsequent bad press concerning inaction and 
misdirected funds following the tsunami represented a major threat to the legitimacy (and 
future support) of the Australian overseas aid organisations.  We propose that one method 
by which these organisations may have attempted to repair their legitimacy would have 
been through the use of impression management tactics in the voluntary disclosure sections 
of annual reports, in particular the CEO letter.   
 
Overseas aid agencies accredited by AusAid must sign the Australian Council for Overseas 
Aid (ACFOA) Code of Conduct prior to receiving government assistance (AusAid, 1999).  
The Code stipulates the production of an annual report and specifies that the report discuss 
current activities/achievements plus provide indications of future directions or planned 
activities.  However neither the Code nor the Guide to the Code of Conduct specifies the 
format of the annual report.  The CEO letter is optional (ACFID, 2007a, 2007b). 
 
Previous studies have found that organisations facing a legitimacy crisis have used 
predominantly defensive tactics.  In their study on impression management, Arndt and 
Bigelow (2000) found that hospitals in Massachusetts undergoing restructuring exclusively 
used defensive impression management tactics such as excuses, justifications, disclaimers 
and concealment when discussing their new corporate structure.  Therefore the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1:  Following the threat to legitimacy concerning tsunami funds, CEO letters in 
Annual Reports of aid agencies will contain more defensive impression management 
tactics after the tsunami than before. 
 
The defensive strategies identified by Mohamed et al (1999) in their taxonomy include 
accounts, apologies, disclaimers, organisational handicapping, restitution and prosocial 
  
behaviour (see Appendix B for an explanation of these terms).  It is not anticipated that 
strategies such as disclaimers and restitution would relate to, or appear in, annual reports.  
Given that the organisations concerned are socially responsible the prosocial category is 
not relevant and we do not anticipate finding organisational handicapping.  The bad press 
concerning tsunami aid was not aimed at specific agencies but was general in nature.  
Therefore we anticipate the defensive tactics applied will be accounts or apologies.  
 
O’Donovan (2002) in a quasi-experimental study on legitimacy tactics found that the 
tactics employed by a firm in repairing legitimacy are related to the level of legitimacy held 
by the firm in the first place.  The more an organisation relies upon its legitimacy the more 
vigilant it needs to be against potential threats.  A charity’s image and reputation have a 
“strong influence on donor behaviour” (Bennett and Gabriel, 2003).  Therefore it is 
assumed that the not-for-profit sector is very reliant on legitimacy.   
 
When legitimacy is threatened not all the tactics employed may be repairing tactics.  
Tactics for gaining legitimacy can be used following a crisis provided that the organisation 
still has some credibility (Suchman, 1995).  Arndt and Bigelow (2000) found the use of 
defensive tactics to defend a new hospital structure.  They also found assertive tactics in the 
information provided on services and technology.  The authors believe that the hospitals 
saw restructuring as potentially damaging to organisational legitimacy and therefore used 
defensive tactics.  The presentations on their services and technology were simply 
maintaining legitimacy they had already gained in these areas and therefore warranted the 
use of assertive tactics. 
 
One would expect to see mostly defensive tactics when tsunami relief organisations 
attempted to repair legitimacy.  However Suchman (1995) suggested legitimacy building 
strategies may be used following a crisis if the organisation still has some credibility.  
Many of these organisations would still retain credibility as major charitable organisations 
and so it is likely that some tactics to gain legitimacy may also be employed.  This would 
involve assertive impression management tactics.  Therefore a further hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
H2:  Following the threat to legitimacy concerning tsunami funds CEO letters in Annual 
Reports of aid agencies will contain more assertive impression management tactics after 
the tsunami than before. 
 
Given the type of organisations involved, it is expected that the organisations would not use 
all the assertive tactics listed by Mohamed et al (1999) and defined in Appendix A.  It is 
anticipated that ingratiation, organisational promotion and exemplification tactics will be 
evident.  However we do not expect to identify intimidation or supplication. 
 
3.0 Research Method 
 
Sample Selection 
The sample selected for this study has been chosen from the list of overseas aid agencies 
accredited by the Australian Government through AusAid; see Appendix B.  The AusAid 
accreditation process aims to ensure that funding is directed to “professional, well 
  
managed, community based organisations that are capable of delivering quality 
development outcomes”.  Membership of ACFID and the Code are voluntary and self 
regulatory unless the organisation is seeking government support (ACFID, 2007a, AusAid, 
2007).  Shortly after the tsunami the Australian government provided a list of agencies 
offering support to those affected by the tsunami on the government website Tsunami 
Assist.  However not all the agencies were accredited with AusAid (Abraham, 2007).  
Therefore this research has selected agencies listed under Tsunami Assist and also 
accredited by AusAid.  These agencies are identified in the listing at Appendix B and 
number twenty-two in total.   
 
It is anticipated that if the agencies intended to respond to the legitimacy threat the 
response would have occurred in the annual reports immediately after the event.  This study 
compares the narrative content of the CEO letters for accredited organisations produced 
prior to and post 26 December 2004.  The selection was based on the premise that annual 
reports take up to three months to produce.  Therefore the prior reports are those with a 
financial year end of 30 September 2004 or earlier.  This preliminary study is based on the 
eleven organisations with the appropriate annual reports available immediately through 
relevant websites on the internet.  All the agencies tested had a financial year ending 30 
June except World Vision whose financial year ends 30 September. 
 
Given that overseas aid agencies work in a contentious area, each agency was checked for 
adverse publicity in the twelve months prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami.  A search of the 
ABC news website was undertaken for each of the selected agencies.  The search revealed 
that most agencies had enjoyed positive press over the last year.  However Australian Red 
Cross had come under considerable criticism and was the subject of an inquiry in relation 
to the disbursement of aid for the Bali bombings (ABC News, 2003, 2004c).  While the 
organisation was cleared of any wrong doing it was considered that the agency may have 
felt challenged and could have responded to this legitimacy threat in the annual report prior 
to the tsunami.  This may have confounded the results of the study.  Therefore this 
organisation was excluded from the study.   This left only ten organisations.   
 
3.0 Data and Method 
 
Data 
Content analysis consists of dividing the text into meaningful subdivisions and of coding 
the divisions according to defined rules.  Content analysis can be both subjective “meaning 
orientated” and objective “form orientated” (Smith and Taffler, 1999:627).  This research 
applied a subjective analysis in which we focused on identifying the underlying message or 
impression management tactic indicated in the texts under investigation.   
 
For this research the narrative was subdivided into text-units or t-units.  In research on 
readability, Sydserff and Weetman (1998:463) make use of this established linguistic text 
analysis tool.  They define a t-unit as “one independent clause with all subordinate clauses 
attached to it”.  The t-unit generally relates to a sentence.  However if the sentence contains 
conjunctives such as “and” and if the subject matter changes it may form two or more t-
units.  This approach is similar to Smith and Taffler’s (1999) analysis of themes and 
phrases.    
  
Each t-unit was analysed to identify if any impression management tactics had been applied 
(see Appendix C for an example of a coded letter).  The coding scheme is based on the 
taxonomy of organisational impression management tactics developed by Mohamed et al 
(1999) (see Appendix A).  Indirect impression management tactics relate to the information 
provided or managed by an organisation about other associated organisations.  It is not 
anticipated that this strategy would be exercised in CEO letters.  Therefore for the purposes 
of this study we examined direct impression management tactics only.  
 
In some cases the surrounding units were used to provide context to a particular t-unit to 
disambiguate the meaning.  As it is possible that more than one tactic may be present in a t-
unit a decision was made to adopt or classify according to the dominant impression 
management strategy.  For example in the following statement ADRA is claiming a 
successful achievement (organisation promotion) but also articulating the social policy of 
the organisation (exemplification). 
By creating opportunities, empowering people and sharing hope, ADRA 
Australia is making a difference to peoples’ lives in many countries (ADRA, 
2005). 
This t-unit was assessed as “organisational promotion”. 
 
Method 
The coding of the CEO letters progressed as follows:  
Stage One 
(1)   Independent identification and coding of t-units in CEO letters by two coders,  
(2) This was followed by the comparison of the individual coding results and resolution 
of disagreements, and 
(3)   Provision was made that if agreement was not reached, final arbitration would be 
made by an independent coding supervisor.  This step was not required for 
identifying the t-units. 
 
Stage Two 
(1)   Once the t-units were agreed upon the next step involved independent identification 
and coding of the impression management tactics in each t-unit in the CEO letters 
by two coders,  
(2)  The results were compared and disagreements resolved, and 
(3)  If agreement was not reached, final arbitration was sought from an independent 
coding supervisor.  
 
Prior to assessment, a pilot study was conducted on four reports for non government 
agencies not included in the research sample.   This process enabled clarification of the 
characteristics for identification of impression management tactics.   
The actual study itself involved two coders with a third coding supervisor available if 
needed for arbitration.  At the first stage, the initial differences in identifying t-units were 
resolved by the two coders.  Disagreements occurred in less than 1% of total t-units.  
 
At the second stage initial differences in identifying impression management tactics 
accounted for 3.9% of the t-units (or 23 of the total 590 t-units).  The coding supervisor 
arbitrated in 35% of the disagreements (8 in total).  While the arbitration percentage 
  
appears high the disagreements were in fact very low.  In view of these coding parameters, 
we concluded that the reliability of the coding could be considered very high.  
 
The number of instances of the use of each impression management tactic was totaled for 
the CEO letter and apportioned to the total number of t-units in each CEO letter.  This 
provided a relative measure of frequency of occurrence for each organisation.  The 
defensive and assertive impression management tactics were also totaled and apportioned 
to the number of t-units per CEO letter.  The results for the reports prior to the event were 
then compared to the results for the reports post the event.  
 
5.0 Results and Discussion 
 
The results of the analysis are attached; see Appendix D.  Table 1 provides a comparison of 
the means of the impression management tactics relating to the sample.  The total defensive 
impression management tactics decreased post tsunami.  The only defensive tactics found 
were accounts; no apologies appeared in the CEO letters.  On average the total assertive 
impression management tactics increased post the tsunami due to increases in the use of 
ingratiation and organisational promotion.     
 
 
Table 1 – Means of Impression Management Tactics 
 
 Mean Standard. Deviation 
 Prior to event Post event Prior to event Post event 
%  Accounts .026 .014 .0534 .0436 
%  Apologies .000 .000 .0000 .0000 
% Total Defensive .026 .014 .0534 .0436 
%  Ingratiation .033 .086 .0309 .0423 
%  Org Promotion .104 .135 .0798 .0532 
%  Exemplification .072 .059 .0638 .0609 
% Total Assertive .210 .279 .1106 .1338 
% Impression Mgmt .236 .293 .1275 .1156 
 
 
Table 2 contains the Mann-Whitney U score (designed for non-parametric samples) and 
level of significance for each type of defensive and assertive tactic as well as for the total 
defensive, total assertive and total impression management tactics used.  These figures 
were calculated as a percentage of the total t-units contained in the CEO letters.  
 
  
Table 2 – Comparison of rankings and significance  
(Grouping Variable: Year) 
 
 Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (1-tailed) 
%  Accounts 40.500 0.152 
%  Apologies 50.000 0.500 
% Total Defensive 40.500 0.152 
%  Ingratiation 14.500   0.0035 
%  Organisation promotion 30.500 0.070 
%  Exemplification 43.500 0.308 
% Total Assertive 35.500   0.1365 
% Impression Mgmt 39.000 0.203 
 
 
Accounts, apologies and total defensive all show no significant difference between pre and 
post reports and therefore Hypothesis 1 is rejected.  The average use of defensive 
impression management tactics actually decreased after the tsunami.  Although the results 
for ingratiation show a significant change between the pre and post letters (based on a one-
tailed test with .05 level of significance), organisational promotion, exemplification and 
total assertive do not show a significant difference between the pre and post reports and 
therefore Hypothesis 2 is rejected.     
 
These results are not consistent with legitimacy theory which suggests that firms would 
increase their defensive and /or assertive impression management tactics after a threat to 
their legitimacy.  Some previous studies have found that firms do increase disclosure 
following a bad news event (Deegan et al, 2000, Ogden and Clark, 2005, Arndt and 
Bigelow, 2000). However, other studies have not supported this proposition (Campbell et 
al, 2003).  One possible explanation for the results in this study compared to previous 
studies is the type of organisation involved.  Previous studies have mostly concerned for-
profit, corporate type organisations.  This study involves charitable aid agencies, a different 
type of organisation altogether with different goals, motives and stakeholders.  It is possible 
that the CEOs of these organisations come from a different background to CEOs of for-
profit organisations and may react in a different manner to perceived threats. 
 
Another explanation may be that some of the CEOs may not have perceived there to be a 
legitimacy gap.  Whether management reacts and how they react is based on their 
perception of a legitimacy gap.  Deegan (2002) believes that when confronted with the 
same facts, not all managers might perceive that a legitimacy gap exists.  Most of the 
publicity was not aimed at any agency in particular (although two agencies were named 
specifically) so CEOs may have thought it better to avoid the issue altogether.  Avoidance 
of an issue is, in itself, an impression management tactic.  Some agencies did not even 
mention the tsunami in the CEO letter despite the fact that they were a registered relief 
agency for the disaster.  It is interesting to note that there were only eleven defensive tactics 
identified in all the sample which contained a total of 590 t-units.  Of these eleven, seven 
were pre tsunami.  Only four “accounts” appeared post tsunami and all of these were in the 
letter from the Annual Report of Caritias.  This is the one CEO letter that seemingly 
  
addressed the bad press concerning funding of tsunami victims.  The CEO mentioned the 
media statements that questioned the way money had been distributed.  Justifications were 
then used to put the case forward for how Caritas donations were disbursed.  Therefore the 
agencies may have responded to the legitimacy threat in some medium other than the CEO 
letter.  They may have responded through press releases, letters to the editor, letters to 
supporters, newsletters or in other sections of the Annual Report. 
 
6.0 Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study analysed the CEO letters from the annual reports pre and post the Boxing Day 
2004 Tsunami to investigate the use of impression management tactics.  As mentioned 
above there may have been other mediums used to address the bad press received by these 
organisations.  This study did not look at press releases or newsletters issued by the 
agencies, nor did it investigate other areas of the Annual Report.  Some agencies devoted a 
special section of their Annual Report to the tsunami and future research could involve a 
qualitative analysis of these special “Tsunami Reports”. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a search of the ABC News Website was undertaken for each of the 
selected agencies to identify negative press that may have affected the content of the CEO 
letters prior to the tsunami.  However this may not have been sufficient to identify issues 
relevant to the agencies involved.  For example, ADRA had five defensive t-units prior to 
the tsunami which all related to an internal restructure.  While this was not reported in the 
press it was obviously of considerable concern to the organisation.  Excluding these five 
defensive tactics would have affected the results significantly. 
 
The number of agencies involved in the study is small and this has implications concerning 
its external validity.  As mentioned in the data section only accredited agencies registered 
on the Tsunami Assist web site were included.  These numbered twenty-two in total.  We 
were unable to obtain the annual reports for some of these agencies in a timely enough 
manner to include them in this study.  Some agencies were also discounted for other 
reasons discussed earlier.  This left us with a sample of only ten agencies.  Future research 
could involve a more complete analysis with all agencies involved. 
 
The use of t-units also presented some problems in the study.  Although the amount of 
disagreement was very low between the coders, the use of t-units as stand alone 
measurement units sometimes presented a challenge when deciding on whether a particular 
unit involved impression management.  Sometimes a unit on its own was ambiguous and 
seemingly did not contain impression management but when read in conjunction with the 
surrounding units it became less ambiguous.   
 
7.0 Conclusions 
 
This study investigated CEO letters in the Annual Reports of overseas aid agencies 
involved in tsunami relief.  It was believed these agencies faced a threat to their legitimacy 
following bad press concerning the use and distribution of tsunami aid.  The letters were 
examined to determine if the agencies responded to this threat in terms of increased 
impression management tactics. 
  
The results show that the organisations did not significantly increase the amount of either 
assertive or defensive impression management tactics post tsunami.  In fact the amount 
of defensive tactics used decreased post tsunami.  These findings are inconsistent with 
legitimacy theory.  Legitimacy and Impression Management theory assert that 
organisations will increase their reactive or defensive disclosure in response to a threat 
and also attempt to maintain the legitimacy they already have by using more proactive or 
assertive tactics.  This study did not find this to be the case.  This research has important 
implications as far as the development of these theories is concerned as it is one of few 
studies that look at a specific type of non government organisation where the stakeholders are
different to the for-profit sector and profit is not the main concern.  More research on 
this sector, especially charities and social welfare organisations, needs to be conducted to 
see if these theories are applicable to this sector of the economy.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
Direct and Defensive 
 
Behaviour Definition Example Demonstration 
Accounts Explanations of a predicament-creating 
event which seek to minimise the 
apparent severity of the predicament.  
Four basic accounting tactics: 
a) denials and defences of innocence 
b) excuses 
c) justifications 
 
a) State the outcome never materialised or 
that the organisation had nothing to do 
with outcome  
b) Provide information which indicates a lack 
of control and therefore shifts the blame 
to the environment 
c) Admit responsibility but disputes the 
negative consequences by minimising the 
negativity, comparison to other equally 
negative events or interpretation in a 
larger set of values or goals 
Many did not realise that once 
the initial emergency 
expenditure had been 
disbursed that there would be a 
program of gradual 
disbursement that would take 
place over many years 
(Caritas, 2005). 
Disclaimers Explanations offered prior to 
potentially embarrassing situation 
For example putting on record limits to the 
service to be provided 
 
Organisational  
Handicapping 
Efforts to make task success seem 
unlikely in order to provide an excuse 
for failure 
For example explaining that immediate 
outcomes were unlikely due to long term 
strategy 
 
Apologies Admissions of blameworthiness for a 
negative event including expressions of 
remorse and asking for a pardon 
This occurs when the organisation accepts 
responsibility with no justification/excuse 
Demonstration not available as 
no examples appeared in the 
reports 
Restitution Offers of  compensation to the 
offended or injured audience 
Offer of complimentary goods  
Prosocial 
Behaviour 
Engaging in prosocial actions to 
compensate for an apparent 
transgression and convince that the 
organisation merits a positive identity 
For example putting in place controls to 
prevent reoccurrence of previous criticisms, 
such as use of donations to cover overheads 
 
 
Direct and Assertive 
 
Behaviour Definition Example Demonstration 
Ingratiation Behaviours used to make the 
organisation appear more attractive 
“Corporate advertising” - 
promoting the organisation as a 
whole rather than its activities.  
“Conformity” - mimicry of 
specific practices, such as 
mention of accreditation 
 
Eg But the strength of Oxfam, as has been 
demonstrated over the last 12 months, is, to 
quote our founder Father Tucker, to be both 
practical and visionary (Oxfam, 2005).  
Caritas Australia conforms with the highest 
of accounting standards (Caritas, 2005). 
Intimidation Behaviours that present the 
organisation as powerful and 
dangerous willing to inflict harm on 
those that frustrate its efforts 
Threat to withdraw services or 
activities 
 
Organisational  
Promotion 
Behaviour that presents the 
organisation as highly competent, 
effective and successful. Can be 
present as either “entitlement” or 
“enhancement.” 
“Entitlement” evidenced by 
“acclaiming” possibly biased 
explanations of successful 
events   
“Enhancement” is  putting a 
positive spin on unclear 
outcomes 
It humbles me as I present you the report on 
the outstanding results we achieved in 2005 
(World Vision, 2005). 
We had an impact – attracting world-wide 
media coverage and, importantly, helping 
to ensure the voices of developing countries 
were heard loud and clear within the WTO 
(Oxfam, 2004). 
Exemplification Behaviour that projects images of 
integrity, social responsibility and 
moral worthiness 
Emphasises social and 
aesthetic qualities that usually 
demonstrate commitment to 
cause no matter the adversities 
We believe that education should and can 
be provided to all children, even in the most 
difficult circumstances (Save the Children, 
2005). 
Supplication Behaviour that portrays an image of 
dependence and vulnerability for the 
purpose of soliciting assistance from 
others 
Identifying internal weaknesses 
or dependence on others to 
solicit aid generally depicted as 
a short term condition 
 
Extract from Mohamed et al (1999) “A Taxonomy of Organizational Impression Management Tactics” 
  
 
APPENDIX B    
List of Accredited NGOs 
Full Accreditation 
• Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) *   
• Anglican Board of Mission Australia (ABM)  
• Anglicans Cooperating in Overseas Relief and Development (AngliCORD) *  
• Australian Lutheran World Service (ALWS)  
• Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad (APHEDA)  
• Australian Red Cross (ARC) * 
• Australian Volunteers International (AVI)  
• Australians Caring for Refugees (AUSTCARE) *   
• Baptist World Aid Australia *   
• Burnet Institute  
• CARE Australia (CARE) * 
• CARITAS Australia * 
• Christian Blind Mission International (Australia) (CBMI) * 
• ChildFund Australia *  
• Credit Union Foundation Australia (CUFA)  
• Every Home for Christ Ltd (EHC)  
• International Needs Australia (INA)  
• International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)  
• Leprosy Mission (TLM)  
• Marie Stopes International Australia (MSIA)  
• National Council of Churches Australia (NCCA)*  
• Opportunity International Australia (OIA) * 
• Oxfam Australia (OAus) * 
• PLAN International Australia (PLAN) * 
• Save the Children Fund Australia (SCFA) * 
• Sexual Health and Family Planning Australia Inc. (SHandFPA)  
• TEAR Australia (TEAR) * 
• The Fred Hollows Foundation (FHF)  
• UNICEF Australia (UNICEF) * 
• Uniting Church Overseas Aid (UCOA)  
• World Vision Australia (WVA) * 
• WWF-Australia 
  
  
 
Base Accreditation 
• Archbishop of Sydney's Overseas Relief and Aid Fund (ORAF) * 
• ASSISI Aid Projects India (ASSISI) * 
• Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF)  
• Australian Cranio-Maxillo Facial Foundation (ACMFF)  
• Australian Foundation for the Peoples of Asia and the Pacific (AFAP) *  
• Interplast Australia (INTERPLAST)  
• Marist Mission Centre (MMC)  
• Quaker Service Australia (QSA)  
• Reledev Australia Limited (RA)  
• Salvation Army (SA) * 
* Listed on official government Tsunami Assistance website as at 25 January 2005 
Extract from website AusAid ‘Overseas Aid’ Australian Government 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ngos/accredited.cfm   February 2007 
 
  
 
APPENDIX C 
Example of Coded Letter 
 
OP = Organisational Promotion  E = Exemplification  A = Account 
--- = Not Impression Management 
 
1. It is indeed a pleasure to report on a remarkable set of results achieved during 2004.   OP 
 
2. The number of people being helped through World Vision Australia increased to  
        12.6 million, up from 10.4 million in 2003.       --- 
 
3. We funded 479 projects in 63 countries, as well as 11 projects aimed at eliminating  
        the scourge of child trafficking.        E 
 
4. This work would not have been possible without the wonderful support of our donors.  --- 
 
5. Cash income from private donors increased by $34 million, or 23%, on last year.   --- 
 
6. When I look at this huge figure, I marvel that it is the sum of thousands of brave  
        choices made by thousands of generous Aussies.        --- 
 
7. We are also encouraging the Government to be equally generous in its giving to overseas  
        aid which reflects this nation’s commitment to a fair go for the world ’s poor.   OP 
 
8. Meanwhile, it is pleasing that giving to World Vision by corporate Australia, in cash  
       or kind, increased by 29% in the year.         --- 
 
9. I look forward to more brave choices being made by our business leaders.    --- 
 
10. Our choice to dedicate a small proportion of our funds towards informing and improving  
       public attitudes towards helping our neighbours is paying dividends.     A 
 
11. We continue to witness improvements in attitudes towards the effectiveness of aid and  
        the belief that the actions of every day people can affect the lives of people living in  
        poverty.           --- 
 
12. This was the aim of our ground-breaking One Big Village website that provides an  
       opportunity for Australians to explore how we are all connected within an enclosed  
       global system, and that something they do or don’t do today will affect the lives of  
       people they’ll never meet.          OP 
 
13. The site received a quarter of a million visits in the two weeks after its launch in  
       September.           --- 
 
14. As we move forward, we continue to challenge ourselves.      --- 
 
15. We are committed to improving our financial efficiency, so that the greatest possible  
        proportion of funds given can be used in our relief and development projects, and  
        achieving maximum effectiveness within our programs around the world.    OP 
 
  
 
16. We witnessed significant improvements in these areas during 2004 and look forward  
        to further improvements in the coming year.        OP 
 
17. We are committed to making the brave choices that these goals will demand.   E 
  
 
APPENDIX D    
Defensive Frequencies 
Organisation Year No of T Units Accounts Apologies Total Defensive
ADRA 0 30 5 0 5
ADRA 1 28 0 0 0
AFAP 0 54 0 0 0
AFAP 1 55 0 0 0
Austcare 0 31 1 0 1
Austcare 1 34 0 0 0
Baptist World Aid Aust 0 25 0 0 0
Baptist World Aid Aust 1 25 0 0 0
Care 0 15 0 0 0
Care 1 31 0 0 0
Caritas 0 23 0 0 0
Caritas 1 29 4 0 4
Oxfam 0 27 0 0 0
Oxfam 1 32 0 0 0
Plan 0 28 0 0 0
Plan 1 33 0 0 0
Save the Children 0 19 0 0 0
Save the Children 1 32 0 0 0
World Vision 0 17 1 0 1
World Vision 1 22 0 0 0
TOTAL  590 11 0 11
 
  
 
Assertive Frequencies 
Organisation Year 
No of 
T 
Units Ingratiation
Organisational 
Promotion Exemplification 
Total 
Assertive 
ADRA 0 30 1 4 0 5 
ADRA 1 28 4 5 4 13 
AFAP 0 54 4 5 2 11 
AFAP 1 55 1 7 0 8 
Austcare 0 31 2 3 2 7 
Austcare 1 34 2 6 2 10 
Baptist World Aid  0 25 1 1 3 5 
Baptist World Aid  1 25 1 3 0 4 
Care 0 15 1 2 1 4 
Care 1 31 3 4 0 7 
Caritas 0 23 0 3 4 7 
Caritas 1 29 2 0 0 2 
Oxfam 0 27 0 0 0 0 
Oxfam 1 32 3 5 3 11 
Plan 0 28 0 2 4 6 
Plan 1 33 3 4 1 8 
Save the Children 0 19 1 1 0 2 
Save the Children 1 32 5 5 4 14 
World Vision 0 17 0 5 2 7 
World Vision 1 22 2 4 3 9 
TOTAL  590 36 69 35 124 
  
 
APPENDIX E  
T-Units and Disagreement 
Organisation Year 
No of T 
Units 
T-Unit 
Disagreements 
IM 
Disagreements Arbitrations
ADRA 0 30 0 0  
ADRA 1 28 0 0  
AFAP 0 54 0 2 1 
AFAP 1 55 0 3 1 
Austcare 0 31 1 1 1 
Austcare 1 34 2 0  
Baptist World Aid Aust 0 25 0 0  
Baptist World Aid Aust 1 25 0 0  
Care 0 15 1 0  
Care 1 31 0 0  
Caritas 0 23 0 0  
Caritas 1 29 0 5 3 
Oxfam 0 27 0 0  
Oxfam 1 32 0 1 1 
Plan 0 28 0 1 1 
Plan 1 33 1 1  
Save the Children 0 19 0 1  
Save the Children 1 32 0 5  
World Vision 0 17 0 1  
World Vision 1 22 0 2  
TOTAL  590 5 23 
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